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INTRODUCTION
Good morning. My name is Tom McDonnell. I am a Profes-
sor at Pace University School of Law. I am delighted to be here
and I am privileged to be moderating this distinguished panel.
It is reputed that Tallyrand once said, "War is too impor-
tant to be left to the generals," inspired by the Universal Decla-
ration of Human Rights,1 which Eleanor Roosevelt worked so
diligently to bring about. Ordinary citizen groups in the last
fifty years have demonstrated that foreign affairs, particularly
as affecting the individual, are too important to be left to heads
of state, to diplomats, or to big business. In 1948, when only
forty-eight nongovernmental organizations had received con-
sultative status with the U.N. Economic and Social Council 2, to-
day 1,350 NGOs have such status. In addition, 1,550 NGOs
have status with the U.N.'s Department of Labor, up from 200
in 1968.
1 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217, U.N. GAOR, 3d
Sess., U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948) [hereinafter Universal Declaration].
2 Id.
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As U.N. Under Secretary General Louise Frechette has
said, "Today it is fair to say that NGOs are now entering into
partnerships with states in the international law-making
process."
Nowhere is this more vividly demonstrated than the events
of the last two years. The international campaign to ban land
mines,3 a coalition of hundreds of NGOs from over fifty-five
countries, using primarily e-mail to organize themselves,
spearheaded a grassroots movement that resulted in a Conven-
tion to Ban Land Mines, which 122 nations have signed and,
now up-to-date, forty-seven have ratified.
Likewise, in July of this year in Rome, the ICC4 came
about, but not simply because states were interested in it. Over
200 NGOs participated in the drafting and ultimate approval of
that statute.
It is true that many challenges remain, but the door of citi-
zen participation in the international law-making process has
now been open, and perhaps will never be closed again due to
the efforts of the human rights movement in the last fifty years.
Our panel will be discussing some of the critical challenges
that nongovernmental organizations and other private actors
face as we move into the next millennium.
Winston Nagan will be discussing the practical and theo-
retical aspects facing nongovernmental organizations, and will
also be discussing and comparing his experience with Amnesty
International and his experience in setting up a new NGO in
Uganda. One thought: of the 1,550 NGOs associated with the
U.N., only 251 come from developing countries. Winston will
give us a little bit of a comparison of some of the concerns that
were raised in the panel discussions last night - that is to say,
our particular concern about dealing with the so-called "second
generation" rights, the rights to economic and social
development.
Winston is a native of South Africa. As a student, he was a
member of the ANC5 . He was exiled from that country in 1964.
He later received degrees from Oxford, Duke, and Yale. He
3 See Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and
Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction, 36 I.L.M. (1997).
4 International Criminal Court.
5 African National Congress.
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was, as you may know, twice the Chair of Amnesty Interna-
tional USA, and he is also a Fellow to the World Academy of
Arts and Sciences. A prolific writer on international legal is-
sues, he is a Professor of Law at University of Florida School of
Law.
Aside from dealing with NGOs per se, we will be discussing
two other non-state actors, the first being the so-called interna-
tional agencies, specifically the World Bank. I am delighted
that on our panel is Patricia Armstrong. She is a Senior Coordi-
nator of the International Financial Institutions Program at the
Lawyers Committee for Human Rights. She is also a member of
the Steering Committee of the North American Assembly, an
organization which works cooperatively with other regional as-
semblies of the NGOs working on the World Bank. She will be
discussing the interaction between her NGO and World Bank
issues.
Lastly, Richard Dicker will be speaking. He is the Director
of Human Rights Watch's program on Corporations and Human
Rights. He has done field work in the Americas and Asia, and
specifically works on the Phillip van Heusen campaign regard-
ing allegations of that company's failure to abide by concerns
regarding freedom of association.
I think we have an exciting group of panelists to listen to. I
look forward to their comments.
1999]
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Human Rights, INGOs, and Global Civil Society*
INTRODUCTION
We are here today to celebrate a landmark event in the
moral experience of our species. In 1948, the Universal Decla-
ration of Human Rights (UDHR) was adopted by the United
Nations General Assembly.' Whatever the juridical limitations
of the declaratory form of this major human rights instrument,
it remains an explicit and authoritative codification of the most
important value-commitments of the international community
taken as a whole. Moreover, notwithstanding the increased ca-
pacity for absolutely lethal violations of the most basic rights of
individuals in all parts of the planet, the UDHR has seen a
steady and critical endorsement of its normative priority, as
well as an intense and critical, contemporary struggle to ground
its normative priority in instances of practical application. In
short, the UDHR has been a critical symbol in the struggle to
enshrine a clearer picture of the foundational concept of human
dignity and has provided a powerful inspiration, as well as le-
gitimizing presence, in the struggle to enhance in the widest
possible way the experience of fundamental respect and human
dignity.
* Prof. Nagan generously submitted a written transcript of the paper he
presented at the Celebration. It is that paper, Human Rights, INGOs, and Global
Civil Society, which is printed here. Notably, his remarks at the Celebration did
not vary substantially from this paper.
1 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217, U.N. GAOR., 3d
Sess., U.N. Doc.A/810 (1984) [hereinafter UDHR].
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It is a very great pleasure to be in New York. Like the
larger social process context of human rights, New York is the
great melting pot of unmelted lumps. It is notorious that the
way New Yorkers seem to identify themselves would suggest
that people like me, who come from the other side of the Hud-
son, actually come from the "great unknown." In a sense, New
York is, from a social process point-of-view, almost a paradigm
of the larger, global human rights challenge. The larger world
community comes with all the complexity of cultural, regional,
religious, ideological, linguistic, ethnographic, gender diversity
and/or stratification. The larger vista of the global community
like New York is a vista - so to speak - which underlying
pressures of globalism is a gigantic melting pot with a vast con-
sistency of unmelted lumps. On the other hand, the senses of
parochialism and inward-looking identifications often serve,
perhaps, the unintended purpose of dis-identifying with the
larger vista of humanity. In a sense, human rights activists
from New York must have a keenly sensitive feel for the nature
and structural preconditions that provoke human rights
problems and challenge the capacity for human rights solutions.
I have been asked to discuss the issue of the role of INGOs
in the making and application of human rights law and prac-
tice. I have, myself, been specifically involved with four major
INGOs, working directly or indirectly with human rights mat-
ters. These include the American branch of the International
Defense and Aid Fund for Southern Africa, the Policy Sciences
Center, Amnesty International, and most recently, the Human
Rights and Peace Centre of Makerere University. I hasten to
add that I have had lesser roles on several other INGOs. For
the purpose of this paper, I am going to focus on the role of IN-
GOs in general. Then, I shall discuss more specifically some of
the problems and issues that have touched upon a human
rights organization that has often involved itself in direct action
to secure human rights on a universal basis (Amnesty Interna-
tional) and an academic INGO concerned with a more special-
ized commitment to human rights activism that is appropriate
to an INGO which has a specific academic mandate, as well as a
broader sense of the intellectual responsibility higher education
must embrace for the enhancement of human rights and peace
(Makerere University, Human Rights and Peace Centre).
[Vol. 11:209210
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Perhaps the most general point that can be garnered from
juxtaposing Amnesty International with Makerere's Human
Rights and Peace Centre is that they are similar in the sense
that they are concerned with human rights and that they are
INGOs. However, they are quite different in the sense that they
do vastly different things within the framework of the interna-
tional human rights perspective. Indeed, this underlies the ba-
sic insight that there are today a vast number of INGOs, who -
I would venture to say in fashionable terms - constitute what
we may loosely call the "civil society." In point of fact, not every
INGO is an operation that seeks benign and ideal humanitarian
and human rights goals. Some INGOs may well be in the busi-
ness of doing everything possible to disparage world order and
human dignity, as for example, in those non-governmental op-
erations that are specialized to organized crime, terrorism,
paramilitary, proto-fascist, hate and violence groups, and so on.
Other INGOs may be the quintessential representatives of pow-
erful political and economic interests, and whose basic orienta-
tion is not to the vindication of the common interest humanity
has in human dignity, but rather to special interest concerns
that may or may not coincide with some version of the human
dignity objective. In other words, we have to be cautious about
the power vacuum produced by an uncritical proliferation of the
global institutions of civil society, recognizing that some of
these institutions of civil society are critical to the struggle for
human rights, while others are critical to the struggle against
human rights.
INGOs, STRUGGLE, AND MULTIPLE PERSPECTIVES ON
HUMAN RIGHTS
The most important insight that we can garner about the
role of the INGO in the protection and enhancement of univer-
sal human rights is that INGOs are essentially involved in a
struggle to vindicate the values of human rights and peace. In
short, we may ask ourselves what currency contemporary
human rights would have in a global system dominated by sov-
ereign States and powerful interest groups animated by the im-
peratives of what Professor Michael Reisman calls the "global
1999]
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war system."2 Let me provide three illustrations of this point.
First, the International Court of Justice recently gave its advi-
sory opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear
Weapons.3 Although the Court was responding to a request for
an advisory opinion from the General Assembly, in fact, this lit-
igation would not have happened but for the pressures which
emanated from those sectors of civil society concerned about the
threat nuclear weapons pose to the future of humanity. A sec-
ond example might also serve to clarify this point. Amnesty In-
ternational had long-made the issue of torture a major part of
both its mandate and its operational techniques to secure the
abolition of torture on a global basis. It is true that the interna-
tional community eventually promulgated an important con-
vention which sought to outlaw torture and related practices.
However, there would be no Torture Convention 4 if not for the
focused activism of Amnesty International in its struggle to se-
cure the legal abolition of torture on a universal basis. In the
context of humanitarian law, it requires no massive documenta-
tion to appreciate the role of the International Committee of the
Red Cross (ICRC) in its work to give legal and political efficacy
to the basic rules governing the ius in bello. What we see in
these three examples is that INGOs, however constituted, are
involved in the struggle for human rights.
I want to explore this general question of the struggle for
human rights somewhat more carefully. The struggle for
human rights is part of the larger struggle within social process
for determining how the most fundamental values of a commu-
nity are to be reproduced and distributed. This means, for ex-
ample, that norm-creation, including human rights norm-
creation, is an ongoing part of the dynamic of the social process
of human interaction, and in this sense, is a struggle for and
about power, and a struggle for constitutionalism and the rule
of law. I submit that the perspective of human rights through
2 See W. Michael Reisman, Private Armies in a Global War System: Prologue
for Decision, 14 VA. J. INT'L. L. 1 (1973).
3 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.C.J. 226, 227-67.
4 Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment [hereinafter Torture Convention], 23 I.L.M. 1027
(1984), as modified, 24 I.L.M. 535 (1985). This Convention was adopted without a
vote by the United Nations General Assembly on December 10, 1984. It was en-
tered into force on June 26, 1987.
212 [Vol. 11:209
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the focal lens of struggle is a very critical aspect of not only the
dynamic component of human rights, but also the larger dy-
namic of social norm generation. In short, INGOs are often the
pressure behind the process which seeks to generate improved
normative understandings about expectations of dignity, im-
proved normative expectations that may be grounded in juridi-
cal form and operational practice, and which as well may serve
as a further incentive for the application and enforcement as-
pect of the human rights normative structure.
It is not my intention to focus specifically on the technical
processes of communication and collaboration within which IN-
GOs have played a critical part in the globalization of human
rights, in the cultural foundations of human rights, and in the
juridical bases of human rights prescriptions. However, it may
be worthwhile if we juxtapose the perspective of struggle about
communication and collaboration for human rights objectives
against the growth of specialized professions, organizations,
and interest groups, all of whom hold deep concerns about the
prospect of human dignity on a universal basis.
Since this meeting is composed largely of members of the
legal profession, it may be noted that the legal profession, and
especially international lawyers, have been a critical building
block for the vindication of human rights, both in theory and in
operational practice. Hence, there is a very substantial tempta-
tion to focus on the UDHR and allied instruments as represent-
ing legal doctrine, sustained by human rights jurisprudence
and falling within the sphere of what, conventionally, lawyers
normally do. Lawyers would bring their skills of analysis, con-
struction, and interpretation in order to define both the uni-
verse of human rights law and the scope of its application.
The difficult relationship between INGOs (that are not spe-
cialists in the juridical sense) and the role of lawyers (who
would have to self-consciously determine what is appropriate
for juridical exposition, prescription, and application) would at
best be a difficult exercise. For example, the temptation of law-
yers may be to hold that certain kinds of alleged rights can
never be reduced to legal rights. This might include the right to
development, the right to peace, or the right to positive social
entitlements. Since these rights are not amenable ostensibly to
juridical resolution, they may not be viewed as human rights at
1999]
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all, from a juridical point of view. This would be the struggle for
perspective within which the law or legal profession would
dominate.
Let us take a second perspective. How would a philoso-
pher, in general, look at the UDHR? A philosopher may see the
UDHR as a species of moral declaration. This would essentially
mean that human rights fall within the framework of the analy-
sis of moral propositions. A philosopher would immediately rec-
ognize that there is a vast amount of normative communication
in the world of social and political experience. However, the
philosopher would nonetheless hold that only a few normative
expressions could qualify for the label "moral proposition," and
fewer still would meet the test of universality. In short, there
may be very few human rights that can meet the test of univer-
sal moral human rights.
Even more controversially, there may be the very founda-
tional question of "what a right actually is." Philosophers have
for example suggested that what is meant by the term "right" is
the term "entitlement." When pressed to determine what an
entitlement is, the answer in all likelihood is, "It is a right."
These will also be influenced by the fact that the techniques of
moral analysis are not the same as the techniques of legal anal-
ysis. While the legal analysts sometimes include philosophical
analysis in the process of justifying human rights, moral theory
basically does not look for a "slot machine" answer to the valida-
tion of the human rights norm. Philosophers basically look at a
process of reason and justification, along the lines of the tradi-
tion of Aquinas and others.
There is a third perspective which we tend to associate with
the social sciences, and often, with those who work in the prag-
matic, philosophical tradition. In this perspective, human
rights must be seen as a theory for inquiry. That is to say,
while the codes and various official and quasi-official communi-
cations tell us a great deal about the content and procedure of
human rights, an understanding of human rights in its relation-
ship to universal dignity requires an ongoing inquiring system.
This perspective is related to the fourth perspective about
which more will be said. If however, we hold that a theory for
inquiry is an important aspect of human rights understanding,
it is because the struggle for human rights often involves, at
[Vol. 11:209214
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least at the frontiers of the subject, a competition for claims and
for normative priority. Thus, for example, the classic conun-
drum of whether the freedom of the press should prevail over
the rights of a defendant. This perspective would throw light on
the social process context of human rights claiming, of human
rights responses to claims, and of the lacunae within which
claims generate limited, marginal or even no responses. In
short, the inquiring lens might open up an important, neglected
area about the problem of the human rights struggle in the form
of claiming, counterclaiming, and the problem of social response
to these phenomena. In other words, this perspective or focal
lens may deepen our understanding of the context of social,
moral, and legal experience.
There is a fourth perspective that I want to get at and put
into the framework of our conversation, and that is the theory of
human rights as struggle, the eternal struggle for justice - the
one that involves the INGOs; the one that involves ordinary
folks; the one that involves the ordinary membership in organi-
zations like Amnesty International, who pay their $25 a year
and try to make some commitment to the improvement of the
human prospect. The perspective of human rights as a process
of struggle inj6cts the issue of social dynamism and social
change. The emphasis on human rights as a component of nor-
matively guided change requires that we understand much
more about the social and the power processes of global society
and the role of critical actors who might be specialized to the
organization and presentation of claims relating to human
rights. In this respect, the role of the INGO is a vital and im-
portant element of the social, power, and constitutive context of
human rights culture seen in global terms.
Another aspect that serves to provide more clarity to the
issue of claim assertion and human rights is the very term
"rights" itself. It is notorious that different perspectives about
human rights may give different nuances to the very term
"right." The conception of rights may vary depending upon
whether one brings a juridical, philosophical, sociological or an-
thropological, or historical lens to the elucidation of the concept
of "right" in general, and "human rights" in particular. Thus,
rights may derive their meaning from some formalistic criterion
of validation, from some justification predicated on the univer-
1999]
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sal moral norm, or from the understandings derived from social
process and moral experience that come in the form of funda-
mental expectations about right and wrong. This is a fertile
area of confusion in a context which is essentially interdiscipli-
nary, and which aspires to a level of practicality rooted in the
actual realities of social organization. To illustrate some level
of confusion, as we have seen, philosophers have often said that
a right is essentially an entitlement. When they are pressed as
to what an entitlement is, they maintain that it is a right. Per-
haps these confusions may be moderated if the conception of
human rights as rights is contextualized to include its founda-
tional animus as a struggle about legal, political, economic, so-
cial, cultural, sexual, racial, and ethnic agitation for an
improved human prospect. The stress on the struggle context of
human rights underlines the importance of understanding what
exactly is happening in civil society from a global point of view,
and to focus on the critical non-governmental actors who consti-
tute the global civil society to determine the scope, character,
and efficacy of their efforts to promote human rights and peace,
or indeed to disparage it.
A BRIEF HISTORICAL REVIEW OF DIVERSE INGOs IN
GLOBAL SOCIETY
One of the important insights that social realists have
sought to bring to the analysis of international relations and
international law is the insistence that the State, while a criti-
cal participant in international, constitutional order, is by no
means the only critical player in that order. Global society to-
day witnesses a vast proliferation of players in the international
arena, in addition to States; these include intergovernmental
organizations, multinational corporations, political parties,
pressure groups, paramilitary organizations, liberation move-
ments, and the vast constellation of national and international
non-governmental organizations, some of which are critical
players in the struggle for human rights and peace. Taken lit-
erally, the terms "non-governmental organization" include
everything that is not governmental. Literally, this could mean
organized crime, such as the Mafia on the one hand and the
Carnegie Foundation on the other. It would be very useful to
provide a historical gloss on the role of critical non-governmen-
216 (Vol. 11:209
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol11/iss1/8
HUMAN RIGHTS AND NON-STATE ACTORS
tal players who have shaped the modern history of our global
social process.
During the 1 7 th, 18 t , and 19' Centuries, global society,
which then was even more highly decentralized than it is today,
came under the influence of interest groups deeply inspired by
economic incentives. These interest groups formed themselves
into vast corporations and may, in some respects, be seen as the
forerunners of the multinational corporations of today. The
English East India Company, founded in 1600, was one of the
most profoundly important political and economic organizations
for the extension of British colonial culture. The company set
up its own courts; it set up its own system of governance and
administration. The company effectively administered India as
a company possession until the latter part of the 1 9th Century
when colonial administration set up the Raj.
The Dutch East India Company was founded in 1602. It
colonized South Africa, which remained a company possession
until the British occupied the Cape in the latter part of the 1 8 th
Century. The company, in large part, was responsible for the
establishment of the Dutch Colonial Empire in what was called
Batavia, and which now is called Indonesia. These companies
(English East India Company and Dutch East India Company)
were essentially commercially driven entities, but their role en-
compassed a great deal more than simply economic imperial-
ism. Not only did these companies rule vast empires for several
centuries, they also laid an essential predicate for the form of
colonial public order of the 19' and early 20' Centuries.
One might also include a brief reference to the British
South Africa Company. The company was controlled by
Rhodes, and Rhodes organized the company in such a way that
the company included within its operations a private army for
colonial expansion. The British South Africa Company con-
quered Zimbabwe and claimed Zimbabwe as its own private
property. In re Southern Rhodesia,5 decided in 1919, the Privy
Council determined that the company could not have actually
acquired the physical property of a whole country as its own
private property; but in fact, neither did the blacks own it; it
was owned by the King of England.
5 In Re Southern Rhodesia, AC 1919.
19991
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Not all interests emerging from the civil society were as
materialistically oriented as the great charter companies. For
example, the London Missionary Society was the institutional
harbinger of the famous philanthropic movement in England,
which was essentially progressive in its own time when it came
to the rights of colonial peoples. The philanthropic movement
was especially interested in the advancement of education, the
abolition of slavery, and represented a major element of the
framework of progressive thinking in international affairs.
INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY AND INGOs IN THE 20 T CENTURY
One of the most remarkable books on the study of interna-
tional relations in the 20' Century was Professor Harold D.
Lasswell's World Politics and Personal Insecurity.6 At the time
Lasswell wrote the book - in the 1930s- , it was said that "it
was an absolutely great book but nobody knew why." The ques-
tion he raised struck at the heart of the conventional approach
to international relations and international law. If interna-
tional relations focused on the problem of conflict and war, it
was a conflict and war between sovereign States. In interna-
tional law, the doctrine was - and to some extent still is -
important. It was a law by sovereign States for sovereign
States. The idea that world politics might include variables of a
non-State character, or that personal insecurity might be a con-
sequence and a condition of the global war system, was a star-
tling idea even in its own time. Indeed, I suspect it is a
startling idea even today. Among other things, Lasswell's the-
ory pointed to a very important foundational precept of the in-
ternational system, that there were participants other than the
State from a realistic point of view that have to be accounted
for, namely, that these participants outside of necessarily the
State framework influence, but who nonetheless condition, im-
pact, and are being impacted by world order issues.
The above insight is reflected in the contemporary era in
the People's Earth Declaration. The Declaration, in part, reads
as follows:
6 HAROLD D. LASSWELL, WORLD POLITICS AND PERSONAL INSECURITY (1935);
(reprinted, 1965).
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We, the people of the world, will mobilize the forces of transna-
tional civil society behind a widely shared agenda that bonds our
many social movements in pursuit of just, sustainable, and par-
ticipatory human societies. In doing so, we are forging our own
instruments and processes for redefining the nature and meaning
of human progress and for transforming those institutions that no
longer respond to our needs.
The People's Earth Declaration is a challenging proposi-
tion. It ties in to some degree with the theme, that when we
look at the INGOs, we look at agents of change; at the processes
of agitation to improve the circumstance in all spheres, includ-
ing the legal, the political, the economic; and more. Moreover, it
seems to be clear that the next millennium will still operate
under the benign - as well as lethal - influences of whatever
world order arrangements we have inherited since World War
II. Among the themes that came out of World War II experience
is the notion of total war - that is, in a sense, a war on the
entire social process itself. This is an important theme.
The idea of conducting war on the entire social process, as
distinct from professional armies relatively exclusively in com-
bat, is a very different and disturbing concept for human experi-
ence. In the context of this kind of war, the role of people's
movements of resistance began to emerge, and therefore we
cannot absolve ourselves from the challenges of people's move-
ments - first in Eastern Europe, later in Africa and Asia and
Latin America - emerging as instruments of radical, some-
times even revolutionary, change. However, their modern roots
are tied to the processes of Nazi hegemony and Japanese proto-
fascism.
The Nuremberg process directly and indirectly impacted
upon the position of non-state actors in international law. The
rise of the Nuremberg Precepts are important in this regard,
and parenthetically, are something of an historical accident,
contrary to the views of some people here that there seems to be
some kind of an inevitability about Nuremberg: it was an acci-
dent that it happened. The first inklings of trials actually came
out of Stalin. In 1942, when some concrete expression was
made to give this suggestion some form, there was resistance to
it. The British were the prime resistors. They did not want it.
They demolished the American delegation negotiating the Nu-
1999] 219
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remberg Precepts in London in 1944. The resilient Americans
showed up in San Francisco in 1945 with a far more compelling
defense of the Nuremberg proposals. The opponents of Nurem-
berg were caught unprepared in San Francisco, and so in retro-
spect, one might see the Nuremberg Process as something of an
accident. Indeed, Stalin had talked about shooting 50,000 Ein-
satzgruppen. Churchill was much more humane and thought
the Allies should shoot about 5,000 of the S.S.
From the standpoint of world order and international rela-
tions, Nuremberg does very important things in terms of theory
and practice. For example, the Nuremberg process penetrates
the veil of the State, and in doing so, radically modifies the
traditional understanding of the concept of sovereignty.
Although there are powerful forces today who often assert a
near absolutist conception of sovereignty, this is a view that is
increasingly seen as a very odd construction of the constitu-
tional position of a State in international society. However the
breach in the immutable, if not omnipotent, conception of sover-
eignty, in large measure, is due to the Nuremberg experience;
and in this sense, that experience is a very revolutionary one.
To extend this analysis further, Nuremberg makes individuals
subject to international law. It also gives those individuals
rights to adequate representation and fair judicial proceedings,
which are rights guaranteed by the international character of
the process. That is to say, Nuremberg changes the subjectlob-
ject dimension of international legal order. The same is true
with people's rights, with individual rights, and with the appli-
cation of humanitarian precepts. The legacy of Nuremberg into
the Charter - with its focus on human rights and on "We, the
people" - does create at least some kind of a modest doctrinal
predicate for non-State actors participating in the system.
We are currently experiencing a post-Cold War era under
pressures of political and economic globalism. Immense pres-
sures are being exerted on the State system. However, these
pressures are different from the pressures experienced during
the heyday of the Cold War. During the Cold War, the pressure
on the State system focused on levels of subordination to Super-
power security and ideological interests. This came at a point
when emerging States were attempting to assert a form of sov-
ereignty that might insulate them from the political hegemony
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of the Cold War. The Cold War produced or reproduced a vigor-
ous assertion of sovereignty on the part of small States, and a
vigorous depreciation of sovereignty at the altar of ideological
expediency of the imperial powers. The Cold War and the aspi-
rations of global hegemony put pressure on the States in terms
of levels of subordination to superpower interests. In addition
to inter-State conflicts were the pressures to decolonize the
world community, and therefore, additional pressures to recog-
nize movements of national liberation and self-determination as
critical players in the international system. These conflicts sim-
ply underlined the critical importance of both human rights and
humanitarian issues in the emerging pattern of changing inter-
national social order.
The critical importance of the civil society construct as an
ideological perspective should also be seen in the context of the
ideological rifts of East and West during the Cold War. In the
East, we had the idea of a total State and a command economy.
In the West, we either had the idea of the democratic State, an
open economy, and the critical space for civil society. The total
State, to the extent that it permits interests to be articulated,
expresses them through the State or through the party. The
democratic State encourages expression of interest that is es-
sentially more anarchic and, in some views, more free.
GLOBALISM, CWIL SOCIETY, AND INGOs: THE NEW IDEOLOGY
The roles of the State and civil society, as well as the
growth of INGOs record a great deal of tension and conflict in
the context of the Cold War era. In this part of the essay, we
throw some light on how these tensions have played themselves
out in the post-Cold War period. One point is very clear: the
idea of civil society, viewed from a global perspective, is to a
very large extent viewed as an incipient form of global democra-
tization. It is unclear, whether as an ideological construct, this
is sufficiently sensitive to the reality of the distribution of power
in the global civil society, but nonetheless, it is ideologically pro-
moted as a very critical component of an improved world order.
The Union of International Associations urges that we are
in the midst of a global revolution relating to the context, struc-
ture, and process of civil society. The organization holds, for ex-
ample, that there are incipient trends toward global
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democratization that are powerful and that there are incipient
trends toward the visualization of an alternative organization
design, although the organization does not tell us exactly what
the alternative design is.
There exist large and complex organizations in the interna-
tional system, which are deeply impacted upon by the commu-
nications revolution. Critical indices are being developed to
determine the extent of cohesion and bonding, as well as the
level of formalization and coherence, of INGOs. According to
the Union of International Associations,
There are many large, complex organizations, whether intergov-
ernmental organizations or multinational corporations - or their
national equivalents. Many not-for-profit organizations are in-
creasingly complex. Such complexity takes the form of numerous
specialized units. The challenge is to ensure that they work to-
gether in a coherent, meaningful manner - however that comes to
be understood. Increasingly, the communications of such organi-
zations are electronically based. The question is how the commu-
nications between the parts are organized.
The "weak-bonding" approach may ensure some valued, but hap-
hazard, communication between specialized units - although this
is often subject to suspicious hierarchical controls or abuse. Some
forms of groupware provide a form of strong-bonding (commit-
ment checking, etc.). But again it may be useful to explore the
notions of interlocking round tables as the basis for the emergence
of new forms of non-hierarchical organization that may be vital to
sustainable community. It might prove to be the case that the
sustainibility [sic] of a community results from appropriate global
configuration - interlocking the diversity of community dialogue
arenas.
When we place these insights in the context of the emer-
gent "new" Globalism Epoch, the importance of understanding
the role of INGOs in the context of the progressive move toward
global democratization requires us to understand more ade-
quately the conditions shaping the future of world order and
world politics. How are we to understand the "forces" of global-
ism and the role of INGOs within it? James Rosenau argues
that "the best way to grasp world affairs today is to view them
as an endless series of tensions in which the forces pressing for
greater globalization and those pressing for greater localization
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interactively play themselves out."7 These forces, Rosenau ar-
gues, are influenced by the skill and communication revolution,
the "organizational explosion"8 which witnesses "staggering
number of new organizations," 9 some tightly organized with
clear lines of interest and authority, and others that are "loosely
structured."10 These processes suggest States are getting
stronger in some respects and weaker in others; there is a reas-
sertion of the archaic idea of "sovereignty," while it is being
eroded by the facts of economic, military, and cultural interde-
pendence. In addition, there is the exponential growth of IN-
GOs, including human rights INGOs.
In short, the structural foundations of international order
are in flux as the locus of power becomes rearranged and in-
creasingly fluid. At the theoretical level, we are witnessing a
profound change in the structure and process of international
constitutional order, in which there is considerable rearrange-
ment of the vectors of control and authority in international so-
ciety. To the credit of the UTN ECSOC, it long ago recognized
the importance of consultative status with INGOs, as indicated
in its Resolution 1296 (XLIV) (1968). Among the criteria for
such status (apart from acting within the Charter framework)
was that such a group have an established headquarters, a
democratic constitution, an international "structure," and con-
trols over its resource base. In conclusion, the role of the IN-
GOs in the defense and enhancement of a global era of human
rights must be seen in light of the emerging world context. The
cliche holds that ours is an epoch of globalism. What exactly
this means is in some measure controverted. As a loose gener-
alization, ours is an epoch of extraordinary dynamic potential-
ity. The capacity to inflict human misery, even to provoke a
crisis of survivability of humankind has enormously enhanced
potentials. Similarly, the capacities to do good, to enhance the
human prospect, and to make great strides toward a public or-
der of universal dignity are also enhanced. The "struggle"
continues.
7 James Rosenau, The Future of Politics, paper presented to the World As-
sembly of the World Academy of Art and Science, November 1998.
8 Id.
9 Id.
10 Id.
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INGOs, HuMAN RIGHTS, AND INFORMAL LAW-MAKING
Human beings, in their interaction and relations with
others, are a norm-generating species. Therefore, it is surpris-
ing and somewhat astigmatic that a foundational idea of tradi-
tional jurisprudence is that all law-making is a State
prerogative. A critical area of note is the role that INGOs actu-
ally play in the processes of norm generation and norm applica-
tion in the human rights context. It has long been recognized
that the associations, affiliations, and groups that constitute the
global social process are indeed institutions with a dynamic "liv-
ing law" component, i.e., there is a factual or behavioral law or
constitution that coexists with the "formal" law. The law-mak-
ing role of INGOs is an understudied phenomenon, but a critical
dimension of human rights law and the legal structure that sus-
tains it. Would we, for example, have had a Torture Conven-
tion" without Amnesty International? Would we have had the
Ad Hoc International Criminal Tribunal 12 without the work of
the Watch Committees? Therefore, we must see in the "new"
epoch that human rights law-making and application is a
richer, more comprehensive, and more complex process than the
older, State-centered paradigm.
The insight relating to the role of INGOs in informal law-
making raises a further practical problem because of the vast
disparity and differences in the structure and organization of
INGOs, even if their objectives are directed at issues of interna-
tional peace and human rights. Essentially, if they are moved
by the ideology and spirit of democracy, and if they see them-
selves as part of the evolution of global civil society moving in-
crementally toward a global process of self-generating
democratic values, then we need to more carefully appraise the
efficacy of critical conditions that sustain notions of democracy
at any level of social organization. In general, this will reflect
upon questions that relate to the nature of the decision process
11 Torture Convention, supra note 4.
12 For example, the Ad Hoc Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and
the Ad Hoc Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda. See generally, M. CHERIF BASSIoUNI &
PETER MANIKAS, THE LAW OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FOR-
MER YUGOSLAVIA (1996); JoHN R. W. D. JONES, THE PRACTICE OF THE INTERNA-
TIONAL CRIMINAL TRIUNALS FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA AND RWANDA (1997);
VIRGINIA MORRIS & MICHAEL P. SCHARF, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL
FOR RWANDA (1998).
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and the claiming process that inform the INGO. How inclusive,
for example, is participation in the decision process of the
INGO? How transparent, accountable, and responsible is that
decision process? The critical institutions of democratic ideol-
ogy must ultimately confront the nature of its essential decision
process. Such a consideration will include a number of specific
issues and questions that must be assayed. For the sake of
brevity, these issues are listed as follows:
1) The issue of transparency.
2) The structure of decision making: is it hierarchical or
democratic?
3) The level of bureaucracy: how permeable or impermeable is the
bureaucracy?
4) The capture of INGOs and the possibility of personal agendas
by the operative decision makers.
5) The issue of secretive decision making within the framework of
an INGO.
6) The possibility of special interest "tunnel vision" conceptions
with respect to functions and operations of INGOs.
7) The possibility that they may be even close-minded in their
critical decision processes and structures insulated, if you like.
8) The complexities of how they are funded, and how responsible
they are for the funding that they get.
9) Invidious problems that touch on competing for scarce funding
resources. In other words, often human rights INGOs, humanita-
rian INGOs, really ought to be functioning with a view to their
extinction. They are rather happy when terrible things happen
because they are funding opportunities.
AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL AND MAKERERE UNIVERSITY'S HuMAN
RIGHTS AND PEACE CENTRE: COMPARISONS
AND CONTRASTS
Amnesty International is one of the most important INGOs
in the human rights movement. It is a non-governmental or-
ganization in the classic sense of the term. It seeks to influence
governments in terms of human rights performance, but it pro-
claims itself to be independent of any governmental influence.
Amnesty International is generally viewed as a First World
human rights organization, although it has a powerful presence
in the Third World as well. It has historically been aggressive
in promoting human rights development as an important part
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of universalizing the influence of its mandate. Amnesty Inter-
national is divided, roughly speaking, into two significant com-
ponents. First, there is the professional staff operating in its
Secretariat and in its national sections. Second, there are the
volunteers, the movement, which is comprised of any person
who wishes to pay modest dues in order to become a member of
the organization. It is a membership intensive organization.
The members make policy, and the supreme policy-making body
within the organization is its elected international council. Be-
cause it is a membership intensive organization, Amnesty In-
ternational incorporates many of the criteria associated with
democratic decision-making, including appropriate levels of
transparency, accountability, and responsibility.
Amnesty International is organized upon the basis of an in-
dependent mandate. That mandate incorporates many of the
important human rights provisions in the UDHR, but it is, by
choice, a narrow mandate; its members fight crucial battles
within the organization to keep the mandate narrow. The rea-
son for a narrow mandate is that the organization is particu-
larly interested in being effective with respect to the protection
of human rights that fall within its mandate. The broader the
mandate, the greater the demands for strategies of action that
are effective. A narrower mandate gives a great priority to the
efficacy of practical, strategic intervention.
Amnesty International's mandate has been extraordinarily
successful, but it is not without its critics. Perhaps the most
important limitation on the Amnesty International mandate is
giving a narrow gloss to human rights that effectively justifies a
narrow conception of human rights, even when that is not nec-
essarily the animating reason for a narrow mandate. A narrow
mandate also imposes a cognitive methodology on those who
employ it. That methodology may run the risk of removing
human rights violations from the relevant social and political
contexts. By de-contextualizing human rights violations, we
may provide short-term gains in the protection of human rights;
however, we may obscure the broader framework of conditions
that reproduce those human rights violations, thereby inhib-
iting broader, strategic policies that are critical to ameliorating
the root causes of gross human rights violations. These limita-
tions are very apparent in context of armed conflict or in the
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context of those forms of conflict that are loosely styled "ethnic
conflict." These kinds of conflicts have not been effectively as-
sayed in Amnesty International's work profile, although the or-
ganization has recognized, perhaps belatedly, the importance of
sustainable and durable peace initiatives to the protection of
fundamental human rights.
In the context of the Gulf War, Amnesty International
emerged with a powerful report detailing the ubiquity of the
grossest forms of human rights violations by the Iraqi dictator,
Saddam Hussein. One of the stories in the report suggested that
the regime had sanctioned the removal of premature babies
from incubators in Kuwait. When the report was about to be
released, the leadership in the organization expressed concerns
about whether its report might not fuel the gods of war. As it
turned out, the report was immediately distributed to the entire
Congress of the United States by the Bush administration and
was used by President Bush as one of the vehicles for the de-
monizing of the Iraqi dictator. This kind of problem is difficult
for a narrowly-focused human rights organization that does not
take a position on who is right or wrong in the context of an
armed conflict. Yet, the report of the organization would have
the effect of an alignment on one side of the conflict, even if this
were not intended. Here, the narrow mandate and its non-con-
textual focus on human rights violations have the disadvantage
of blinding the organization's decision-makers to the political
consequences of releasing such a report. Perhaps if Amnesty
International had been a broader human rights group con-
cerned with peace as well, it might have been easier to strike a
balance between its need to tell the truth, and its need to tell
the truth in a timely and responsible manner.
The narrow mandate of Amnesty International also pro-
vided the organization with great difficulties in accepting the
possibility that it could denounce apartheid. It maintained,
somewhat disingenuously, that apartheid was purely ideologi-
cal and that its policies relating to the freedom of conscience
would not permit a resolute condemnation of it. Although it
had been argued that apartheid was more than ideology, that in
fact it was operational policy and practice - and that as opera-
tional policy and practice, it was completely inconsistent with
the entire prescriptive force of the UDHR - the organization's
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decision structure was never able to sufficiently contextualize
the apartheid process to secure a clear condemnation of it as
simply inconsistent with human rights and with the organiza-
tion's own mandate.
These problems are illustrative of the proposition that, on
the one hand, human rights activism involving mass-based par-
ticipation requires simplification in order to generate the rele-
vant level of legitimizing efficacy. On the other hand, the
conception of human rights, somewhat immunized from context
- and therefore immunized from understanding the complex
interdependencies that shape the broader and more comprehen-
sive relationship of human rights to peace and human rights to
justice-, is in some measure sacrificed. Stated shortly, an INGO
such as Amnesty International represents important possibili-
ties, but also important limitations in universalizing the culture
of human rights for the millennium.
We may now move to the experience of creating a Third
World INGO, the Human Rights and Peace Centre (HURIPEC)
of Makerere University in Uganda. The most important factor
about the HURIPEC is that it is located in a center of higher
learning, and therefore, its focus cannot be entirely on activism.
Since the primary purpose of a university is education and en-
lightenment, it will be obvious that the foundational question of
a self-respecting human rights and peace center will be on the
very conception of human rights itself. Since in the university
setting almost every aspect of learning and pedagogy has some
intersection with some aspect of peace and human rights, it will
be obvious that an academic center of learning must, for aca-
demic purposes, embrace a conception of human rights that is
comprehensive and far-reaching. This basically means that,
however inchoately expressed, human rights - in the first in-
stance - represents a kind of theory for inquiry. The bounda-
ries of human rights, from an intellectual point of view, are not
finite, but are critical for scientific inquiry, philosophical reflec-
tion, and juridical application.
With this background, the establishment of HURIPEC
came in the context of a society that had experienced nightmar-
ish human rights deprivations during the period of Idi Amin
and Milton Obote. The most practical initiative brought in at
the beginnings of the project was how to create programs that
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would capitalize on student and faculty initiatives and energy
for which there could be practical benefits. Since the project
was started in Makerere University's law school, the represen-
tation of the poor and the position of women presented natural
opportunities for outreach. From these experiences, HURIPEC
developed proposals for expanding the curriculum of the entire
university so that every student entering the university would
have to take a course in human rights and peace as a condition
of graduation. The course would be taught by a team of faculty
from many different disciplines, and at its heart, would be a
multi-method, interdisciplinary approach to human rights.
HURIPEC also developed a series of workshops that would
promote a renaissance in interdisciplinary perspectives, from a
human rights point of view. Each discipline was asked to reflect
on what it did in teaching, public service and outreach, and re-
search that had an impact on issues of human rights and peace,
conceived of in the most comprehensive sense. Ultimately, the
organizers of HURIPEC saw human rights and peace as mat-
ters of foundational intellectual responsibility. Therefore, those
organizers envisioned that ultimately the university itself could
not be seen as being either neutral or above matters of peace
and basic dignity. In short, the purpose of the university,
through the advancement of its teaching, research, and public
service missions, is to take intellectual and social responsibility
for peace and human rights.
HURIPEC has become an important intellectual arena for
continental, regional, and national networking to bond the vari-
ous segments in the various communities that are concerned
with peace and human rights issues. HURIPEC's bold efforts
- in not simply making human rights and peace a part of the
university's agenda, but also in making it central to the identity
and the mission of the university - may have far-reaching im-
plications for higher education in Africa. In a region such as the
Great Lakes, where political instability and insecurity are om-
nipresent facts of life, taking leadership in such an enterprise is
not without its risks. Nonetheless, it is precisely this kind of
courage and this kind of initiative emanating from the civil soci-
ety that poses the important challenge for the business of tak-
ing human rights and peace seriously as we approach the
millennium.
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INGOs do not resolve the problems of managing power
responsibly in the international arena. However, their exist-
ence and importance provokes a critical dialogue about the rela-
tionship of civil society to state action and the relation of these
interests to the culture of human rights, and global common in-
terests in peace, security, ecological integrity and the basic de-
cencies in human associational behavior we equate with
inherent dignity and respect.
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Associate Counsel, Human Rights Watch
I want to begin my remarks on this celebratory occasion by
noting the exciting growth of both human rights standards and
the human rights movement. I think both Tom and Winston
gave a sense of the growth of the human rights movement over
the last fifty years. But certainly, the number of international
human rights instruments has increased. The coverage, the
number, and the types of people and violations included under
those standards have increased.
I think it is important for us to take note of the real dyna-
mism and evolution in the conceptual and theoretical nature of
this movement. I think it is crucial because to remain relevant
and effective, we need to remain very dynamic, and I do not
think anyone would argue that now is not a time for compla-
cency. We need to be dynamic and principled because the world
is changing and more is demanded in order to extend protec-
tions to individuals and victims.
I want to root my remarks really in the history of a need for
dynamism and development. Admittedly, while I will be a little
bit provocative this morning, there can be no question that in
the area of non-state actors, and particularly corporations, the
movement needs to develop its tools and the standards that
have enabled us to work effectively with government actors over
the last fifty years. Very quickly, I want to sketch out the objec-
tive landscape as we see it.
The greater mobility of capital and its penetration abroad
has had profound human rights consequences. The importance
of corporate social responsibility for human rights has been un-
derscored by the opening of markets worldwide and the interna-
tional, national, and local measures to attract capital
investment. Increasingly, corporations operate in states with
widespread and serious human rights violations.
Since the end of the Cold War nearly ten years ago, invest-
ment has moved into countries from which it had been previ-
ously barred - Vietnam, Cambodia, Eastern Europe, and the
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former Soviet Union. Investment has also flowed into countries
in which it had been present previously, but the investment
now takes a much more dynamic form - I am thinking of El
Salvador, Guatemala, India, to name only a few. This is true in
manufacturing, especially export assembly production, but also
in oil and mining.
In addition, accompanying these objective trends there has
been a decreased role of government and intergovernmental
assistance and loans. For these reasons, corporations often
have considerable power to influence human rights practices in
the countries in which they operate. At the same time, poor
human rights conditions reflect a lack of respect for the rule of
law that may threaten international investments in the
country.
In either case, corporations investing in large-scale opera-
tions owe it to their investors and taxpayers, not to mention po-
tential victims of human rights violations, to address human
rights conditions in countries they have targeted for
investment.
Now, over the last several years, much attention has fo-
cused on low-wage, labor-intensive industries - like textiles,
apparel, footwear, and electronics - where companies fre-
quently jump to new locations for lower and lower wages, and
locations where governments are more tolerant of labor rights
abuse.
I will focus this morning on another sector where, for stra-
tegic reasons, Human Rights Watch has targeted its work, the
extractive industries, and particularly oil.
In the extractive sector, the search for finite natural re-
sources compels companies to pursue resources wherever the
commodity can be found. Propelled by rising demand and new
technologies over the last several years, multinational oil com-
panies have explored and drilled across large swathes of in-
creasingly remote areas. Multinational oil companies are
working vigorously to drill and transport oil out of Central Asia,
Africa, and the Americas to far-flung markets abroad.
We have monitored oil and gas extraction projects in
Burma, Colombia, and Nigeria, carried out by IGEP, British Pe-
troleum, Elf Aquitaine, Occidental Petroleum, Royal Dutch
Shell, Total, and Unocal,
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We know from a conceptual point of view that basic inter-
national human rights standards were not drafted to apply to
corporations, and we have worked to fill a real conceptual gap.
My organization has tried to do that by developing a conceptual
approach of working guidelines that are based on an accomplice
liability theory; that is, complicity by corporations in govern-
mental human rights violations. I want to just extract a little
bit from the policy that we have developed to give you a sense of
how that works.
Recognizing that corporations have become a potent force
in the shaping of human rights worldwide, Human Rights
Watch believes that businesses have a duty to avoid complicity
in, or advantage from, human rights violations. We focus our
research and advocacy efforts on circumstances where that duty
has not been fulfilled and where companies have complicity in
governmental human rights violations. There are a few para-
digmatic situations where we see complicity.
We are most concerned about situations of direct corporate
complicity. In these instances, businesses facilitate or collabo-
rate in government human rights violations. So while govern-
ment forces commit the violations, corporations have acted as
accomplices and beneficiaries.
One manifestation of this kind of complicity is a situation
where the company acts as an agent of a human rights-violative
policy of a government. An example that comes to mind is the
Chrysler Beijing Jeep firing of a worker who was detained by
the Beijing Public Security Bureau in 1994 for his involvement
in unauthorized religious and pro-democracy activities. Essen-
tially, Chrysler's decision to fire this individual was an imple-
mentation of the Beijing Public Security Bureau's persecution
and harassment of him.
Another such example that certainly was in the news a few
years back is Royal Dutch Shell's involvement in security force
attacks on Ogoni protesters in southeastern Nigeria. In that
situation, the company failed to criticize human rights viola-
tions that were committed in a wide-scale manner when the au-
thorities were acting in response to corporate requests for
security protection. That is direct corporate complicity.
There is another form that we have seen and we are con-
cerned about. That is when corporations derive advantages
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from the failure of government respect for, and enforcement of,
their international human rights obligations. In this situation,
governments are involved in systematic violations of rights and
they fail to uphold their obligation to implement laws to comply
with obligations. It is, in a sense, a situation of state omission
and corporate commission, if you will.
The example I have in mind is General Motors' systematic
practice of sex discrimination in conducting forced pregnancy
testing on the Maquilladores in northern Mexico. Despite work-
ers' complaints to state agencies responsible for enforcing Mex-
ico's laws that were consistent with the ICCPR,1 as well as the
Convention on the Elimination Of All Forms of Discrimination
Against Women, 2 Mexico failed to protect those rights and Gen-
eral Motors was a beneficiary of that failure.
The third instance of corporate complicity are those ex-
traordinary situations where we would recommend no new pri-
vate investment, a suspension of business operations, a boycott,
or even a withdrawal of all foreign private investment. Such a
situation where we would criticize corporate presence per se is
exemplified by the conditions in Burma today under the SLORC
military junta.
Such a situation is characterized by several of the following
factors: grave and systematic rights abuse, abuses of such a na-
ture that no business enterprise can avoid taint by operating in
the country; no form of pressure from the international commu-
nity has had, or has, any reasonable prospect of having a signifi-
cant effect on those abuses.
That, in a nutshell, is the working model of complicity that
we have tried to develop in a conceptual way to fill some of the
gap that we see in the international standard. Now, this is only
a working formulation, and I do not want to suggest that this
guideline is the last word. We have a long way to go in deepen-
ing our analysis, and we are looking at other paradigms.
One very interesting and provocative analysis is developing
in U.S. litigation. This is emerging in the case brought by Bur-
mese citizens against the Burmese Government and Unocal
I International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. U.N.T.S. No. 14668;
Vol 999 (1976) G.S. Res. 2200A (XXI), 21 IN. GAOR Supp. (No.16) at 52, U.N. Doc.
A/6316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 171.
2 U.N.T.S. No. 20378 Vol. 1249, Dec. 18, 1981.
[Vol. 11:231
30http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol11/iss1/8
HUMAN RIGHTS AND NON-STATE ACTORS
Corporation, 3 which had entered into a joint venture for the
construction of a natural gas pipeline from the Yadana natural
gas field through Burma to Thailand. The case is being liti-
gated in U.S. District Court in California.
I want to focus on one aspect of Judge Paez's order of April
1997 that was issued in response to Unocal's motion to dismiss.
The judge held the court did have jurisdiction over claims
against the oil company even if it did not have jurisdiction over
the Burmese Government, and the applicable legal standard
was the Alien Tort Claims Act.4
The plaintiffs have alleged that SLORC,5 the Burmese mili-
tary junta, and the Burmese state oil companies were agents of
Unocal, that the defendants were joint venture partners work-
ing in concert with one another, and that the defendants had
conspired to commit violations of international law alleged in
the complaint in order to further this gas pipeline. The plain-
tiffs allege that the private defendants were jointly engaged
with state officials in the challenged activity - namely, forced
labor and other human rights violations - in furtherance of the
pipeline project. These allegations the court found were suffi-
cient to support subject matter jurisdiction under the Alien Tort
Claims Act.
What is particularly interesting - and this is what I really
want to signal for you here - is the court's treatment of the
state action requirement under the Alien Tort Claims Act.
Judge Paez identified four distinct approaches that the
Supreme Court had articulated on state action requirement:
public function, state compulsion, nexus, and joint action. In
this instance, the court applied the joint action approach and it
found that the private actor (Unocal) could be a state actor if it
was a willful participant in joint action with the state or its
agents. Thus, the court found state action on the basis of a joint
venture agreement.
Admittedly, this was a case of tort liability. But the issue of
interest here is not the similarity or dissimilarity of tort litiga-
tion and international human rights standards, but whether
3 Doe v. Unocal 27 F. Supp. 2d 1174 (1998).
4 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1994).
5 State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC).
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these tests for state action provide an appropriate mode of anal-
ysis for complicity in human rights violations.
In any case, I want to set that out on the table. I think it
opens some very interesting questions that need to be thought
through carefully. But what I see here is the possibility of tak-
ing a fresh look at those ways in which international human
rights standards can be applied directly to private actors.
Now, having touched on corporate complicity, I want to talk
very briefly about the emergence in the last few years of an ex-
citing and interesting development, and that is the effort by cor-
porations to develop voluntary codes of conduct. There have
been numerous initiatives here in the United States and in
Western Europe. Some of these are very promising.
The Apparel Industry Partnership, the Council on Eco-
nomic Priorities, Social Accountability, 800 Program, these pro-
mote global codes of conduct on fair labor practices and include
an attempt at credible independent monitoring. There is too lit-
tle time to go into these in any detail, but I do want to flag two
points for you.
First, the problem that we have seen is the translation of
broad standards into specific policies. In other words, when you
talk with Royal Dutch Shell or you talk with British Petroleum,
the issue is not the formulation of the broad human rights norm
and their acceptance of it as much as it is translating that into
specific policies that will make a difference. The rubber hits the
road outside the gates of the Royal Dutch Shell factory in Ogoni
land, and that is where the broad principle needs to be refined
and articulated as a principle.
Another issue, and a very, very difficult issue with these
voluntary codes of course, is implementation, and specifically
the transparency of implementation and the involvement of
outside actors, particularly actors from the local NGO commu-
nity, and not keeping any monitoring and reporting on corpo-
rate adherence to these voluntary codes an in-house affair.
Those are big problems.
I think that the two programs I mentioned, the AIP and the
Social Accountability Standards, have made efforts at that. But
we have yet to see - really, it will take a while - what the real
fruits of those activity are.
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I want to just flag for you the kind of specific policies we
think corporations need to adopt if their commitment to human
rights is to be something more than a public relations gesture.
For example, we did a report on oil companies in Colombia,
where the oil companies were making direct payments to mili-
tary forces protecting their facilities and those military forces
were linked to widespread human rights and humanitarian law
violations. We recommended - and this would have been
adopted voluntarily by British Petroleum if they chose to do so
- that:
* The companies insert a clause into any security agreement
signed with the government or any state entity that requires
as a condition of contract that state security forces operating
in the area of company installations conform to the human
rights obligations the government has assumed, as well as
under the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, as well as other international human rights and hu-
manitarian norms.
* Where such formal arrangements exist, the companies' secur-
ity agreements with state entities should be made public, with
the sole exception of operative details that could jeopardize in-
dividual lives.
• The companies should insist on screening the military and po-
lice who are assigned for their protection in consultation with
the defense ministry and civilian government agencies in
charge of investigating human rights violations, such as na-
tional commissions on human rights.
So there are a number of very, very specific steps we think
British Petroleum, Royal Dutch Shell, other large multinational
oil companies, can implement to minimize the danger of their
becoming complicit in government human rights violations.
Let me conclude by just saying that the fact that we lack
standards that the international human rights movement
needs, and that are necessary to ensure respect for universally
recognized human rights, underscores an important challenge
for us. The question it raises is, "If there is a gap, why not fill
it?" - which raises the following question, "how to best fill the
gap?"
I want to put a possible solution on the table. It is an idea
that we have talked about at Human Rights Watch, and others
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have undoubtedly discussed as well. Why not an international
standard governing corporate conduct for involvement in
human rights violations?
If you talk with officials from any of a number of U.S.-based
corporations about the importance of their avoiding complicity
in governmental rights abuses and their adopting a proactive
approach, they quickly tell you, "How can you expect us as an
American company to do this, because if we stick our head up
above the parapet on human rights issues, we will be disadvan-
taged vis-a-vis our German or Canadian or French of Japanese
competitors? You think those companies give a damn about
human rights? We will lose out."
I think there is a grain of real truth to that, underscoring
the fact that these practices will not best be regulated either
through voluntary codes or national legislation on the domestic
level. We are dealing, obviously, with a globalized situation,
and the way to respond to that is through an international
standard.
Now, there was an unsuccessful experience two decades ago
attempting to draft a code for transnational corporations. That
ran aground on the shoals of the new international economic
order. But the world has changed a great deal since then. We
are no longer in a world that is polarized by ideological and
sharp political divisions, and certainly the market economy's
hegemony is under no serious challenge.
We have seen in the apparel and footwear industries, the
food industries, more recently among some oil companies, an ef-
fort at self-regulation. Why not create a standard that state
governments, both those hosting multinationals and those
where multinationals are operating, could adopt that would
govern the human rights conduct of corporations?
Certainly, we could identify many, many reasons why this
would be difficult, and undoubtedly it would be. But would it be
wrong? Wouldn't it actually be right? I leave that thought with
you in the spirit of this important anniversary.
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Patricia Armstrong
Senior Coordinator, International Financial Institutions
Program Lawyers Committee for Human Rights*
I will try today to very briefly discuss the World Bank and
human rights, and some of the factors related to efforts to in-
crease the Bank's consideration of human rights related to its
work. The World Bank is of course just one of several interna-
tional financial institutions whose activities directly affect or
implicate human rights concerns, e.g., the International Mone-
tary Fund and regional institutions like the Inter-American De-
velopment Bank, the Asian Development Bank, and the
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. But due
to time constraints, a focus just on the World Bank makes sense
- it is the largest and most influential of the multilateral de-
velopment banks, often setting the pace for other institutions.
It is useful to note at the outset that while this Panel is to
focus on "non-state actors," the World Bank and similar institu-
tions are a bit of a hybrid, as they are created and owned by
states. Thus, in a technical sense, they are not really non-state
actors. However, given the fact that the management and staff
of the Bank have enormous authority on a wide range of issues
and decision-making that do not require the involvement of the
Bank's board and its governmental representatives, its inclu-
sion in this discussion is appropriate.
What I would like to try to do in the short time available is
to discuss four areas: first, to review some of the relevant his-
tory of human rights at the World Bank; second to mention
some recent developments; third, to briefly note the types of
human rights issues that often arise in Bank activities; and
fourth, to suggest some approaches and strategies to advance
the consideration of human rights.
* Ms. Armstrong generously submitted a written transcript of the paper she
presented at the Celebration. It is that paper, The World Bank and Human Rights:
Policies and Prospects, which is printed here. Notably, her remarks at the Cele-
bration did not vary substantially - if at all - from this paper.
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To understand the World Bank's current view of human
rights, it is useful to know a bit of its earlier encounters with
the issue. Until the late 1980s, issues were almost entirely
brought to the Bank as a result of external pressure.
First the United Nations, of which the World Bank is a spe-
cialized agency: In 1965 and 1967 the UN General Assembly
passed resolutions calling for its specialized agencies to deny
economic assistance to South Africa and Rhodesia because of
their apartheid and other policies in Africa. The World Bank's
response was that its charter prohibited it from complying with
these resolutions. Article 4, Section 10, of the Bank's Articles of
Agreement - the provision invariably cited in discussions
about human rights - states:
The Bank and its officers shall not interfere in the political affairs
of any member; nor shall they be influenced in their decisions by
the political character of the member or members concerned.
Only economic considerations shall be relevant to their decision,
and these considerations shall be weighed impartially in order to
achieve the purposes stated in Article I.
The UN's legal counsel disagreed with the Bank's interpreta-
tion, arguing, I think correctly, that this provision was intended
to prohibit interference by the Bank in internal political affairs
and discrimination against a government because of its political
character (e.g., socialist, capitalist, etc.). 2 However, that view
did not prevail and the Bank continued to approve loans to
South Africa and Rhodesia.
Human rights concerns have also been raised by individual
members of the Bank. It must be remembered that no one gov-
ernment can control the Bank: each holds only one weighted
vote related to its contribution - e.g., the United States, while
the largest shareholder, has less than 17% of the voting power.
In 1977, Section 701 of the International Financial Institu-
tions Act 3 was passed as a result of the Bank's controversial aid
to human-rights-violating Chile. Section 701 requires United
1 Articles of Agreement of the International Bank for Reconstruction and De-
velopment, opened for signature, Dec. 27, 1945, 60 Stat. 1440 (1946), TIAS No.
1502, 2 UNTS 134, as amended Dec. 16, 1965, 16 UST 1942, TIAS No. 5929.
2 See 21 UN GAOR 4:20, UN Doc. A/C.4 SR 1653 (prov. ed. 1966), reprinted
in 6 International Legal Materials 171, 172 (1967).
3 22 U.S.C. 262d.
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States representatives at the World Bank and other MDBs to
oppose loans to governments engaging in "gross violations of in-
ternationally recognized human rights" except if loans "directly
benefit the needy." While the effectiveness of this law can be
debated, it did raise the visibility of human rights in the World
Bank and other MDBs, as well as in the U.S. Treasury Depart-
ment. Since then, other US laws addressing human rights is-
sues have been passed, including ones calling for fair labor
practices, respect for the rights of indigenous peoples and the
promotion of good governance, participation and reduced mili-
tary expenditures.
In the 1980s, World Bank staff members started to give
human rights more attention, although typically not using
human rights terminology. They instead relied on terms like
"governance" and "participation," a practice that largely contin-
ues today. For the most part, their consideration of human
rights was not for the value of these rights as rights, but rather
for what they contribute to economic performance, or, more pre-
cisely, development effectiveness. This broadening reflected
their conclusion that economic performance was not just af-
fected by a policy but also the policy environment in which it
was implemented, and this could involve human rights.
In 1989, the Bank published a report in which the Bank
explicitly referred to human rights.4 For example, the report
referred to the importance of the rule of law which "implies re-
habilitation of the judicial system, independence for the judici-
ary [and] scrupulous respect for the law and human rights at
every level of government . ."5 The rubric used for these is-
sues was governance.
The growing attention to human rights prompted the
Bank's General Counsel, Ibrahim Shihata, to issue a legal opin-
ion in late 1990 in which he sought to "establish a legally sound
framework for treating the issue of governance in the Bank's
work."6 Denominating human rights as "political" within the
4 World Bank, Sub-Saharan Africa - From Crisis to Sustainable Growth, A
Long-Term Perspective Study (1989).
5 Id. at 192.
6 Memorandum of the Vice President and General Counsel, "Issues of 'Gov-
ernance in Borrowing Members - The Extent of Their Relevance Under the
Bank's Articles of Agreement", at 2 (Dec. 21, 1990).
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context of the charter, Mr. Shihata reiterated the charter's re-
strictions, but then stated that a violation of political rights
might reach such proportions as to become a Bank concern due
to their economic effects but only if such effects were "signifi-
cant," "direct" or "preponderant."7 This opinion opened an im-
portant door.
So what do governance and participation mean in human
rights terms at the World Bank? Neither concept has yet been
reduced to an operational requirement, so there is no formal
definition. Governance is quite a flexible term, but its human
rights dimensions have generally related to transparency, ac-
countability and a predictable legal framework. This usually
means the need for an independent judiciary, a free press, an
active and involved civil society, and non-discrimination laws
(regarding the latter, the Bank has said: "Inherent in the con-
cept of the rule of law is the notion of fairness and social
justice"8 ).
I must also note that one of the strong motivations for the
Bank's consideration of governance issues from the beginning to
the present has been its concern about corruption. Human
rights and corruption are not synonymous but are linked in
many ways. Perhaps more importantly, no fight against corrup-
tion will be successful without respect for human rights.
Participation, a related concept, was developed simultane-
ously and closely related to the Bank's thinking about govern-
ance. Very generally, participation means the involvement of
those affected by Bank activities - stakeholders - in their
planning and implementation. Again, development effective-
ness is the ultimate objective. The benefits provided to the
Bank by participation include:
1. knowledge of how the intended beneficiaries of Bank activities
see their needs and priorities
2. increase grassroots watchdogs who can monitor and press for
government accountability, and
3. through operational collaboration with NGOs, better imple-
mentation of Bank projects than if the Bank was working
solely with governments.
7 Id. at 38, 55.
s World Bank, Governance: The World Bank's Experience, at 23 (1994).
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Participation, like governance, has important human rights
dimensions, most notably the importance of freedom of associa-
tion, assembly and expression.
But what about economic, social and cultural rights? In
contrast to civil and political rights, the Bank has taken a less
restrictive approach to economic and social rights. Indeed, it
has stated that they are its raison d'etre. The problem for a
human rights activist is how the Bank addresses these rights in
its work. In essence, the Bank has stated that its respect for or
observance of these rights is inevitable, even automatic, as it is
subsumed within the Bank's poverty alleviation efforts - for
example, in strategies to promote job creation or provide basic
social services.9 While there is no question that many Bank
projects address important economic and social issues, the plan-
ning, design and implementation of these projects or its policies
more generally are not undertaken with a rights-based-
approach.
While the Bank's parameters for its consideration of
human rights which I've just described are still largely in place,
there have been a number of developments which present - or
seem to present - opportunities for greater attention to human
rights by the Bank. I will try to quickly note changes in five
areas.
"Good governance" has continued to get attention and very
soon will likely be an important criteria for the allocation of aid.
This will occur through a soon-to-be completed agreement gen-
erally known as the IDA-12 Replenishment Agreement. Re-
plenishment agreements are negotiated every three years by
donors to the arm of the Bank that lends to the poorest coun-
tries, the International Development Association (IDA). The
agreement sets terms and conditions on the use of the donors'
contributions and in recent years has been an important tool to
advance Bank reform. For example, the IDA-10 agreement in
1992 called for the liberalization of the Bank's information pol-
icy and the creation of a new complaint mechanism, now the
World Bank Inspection Panel, both of which were hard-fought
NGO objectives. The recently negotiated IDA-12 agreement,
9 See, e.g., "The World Bank and the Promotion of Human Rights," UN Doc.
A/CONF.157/PC/61Add.19 (June 10, 1993) [the Bank's submission to the World
Conference on Human Rights in Vienna in June 1993].
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which still has a few steps to go before finalization, reportedly
will require that the governance of a recipient government be
taken into account in determining the allocation of the Bank's
aid dollars. Details about this new requirement are not yet
available, so it is not clear how "governance" will be defined or
how it will be applied. It is therefore difficult to assess what
this change will mean, but it appears to be significant. Given
that the term governance is subject to a variety of interpreta-
tions, it will be essential for this new criteria to be monitored
closely to ensure that it is applied fairly - no matter what the
size and influence of a country - and consistent with relevant
international standards, including human rights norms.
In the area of participation, the Bank continues to empha-
size its importance. Among the developments - not all of
which are positive - are:
1. The Bank has increased the number of staff focusing on NGO
issues at headquarters, in both central and regional divisions,
and created new staff positions in a majority of its resident
missions in borrowing countries.
2. There has been a welcome acknowledgment by the Bank of
the importance of an enabling environment for NGOs if they
are to be able to contribute to Bank activities. However, the
translation of this acknowledgment into practice has fallen
short and raised serious human rights concerns. In 1997, the
Bank issued a discussion draft of a document called the
"Handbook on Good Practices for Laws Related to NGOs." In
the Lawyers Committee's view, this document is inconsistent
in several respects with international freedom of association
principles and, as a result, presents risks to NGOs, particu-
larly advocacy groups. 10 While the Bank has agreed to revise
the draft Handbook and the problems will hopefully be cor-
rected, its approach in this instance reflects a serious lack of
due regard to human rights principles directly relevant to its
work.
10 See Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, "The World Bank, NGOs and
Freedom of Association: A Critique of the World Bank's draft 'Handbook on Good
Practices for Laws Related to Non-Governmental Organizations'" (November
1997).
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3. Likewise, a recent Bank paper discussed by its Board11 while
reaffirming the importance of NGOs to its work, also notes as
an "emerging issue" the need for the Bank to give "due regard
to the prerogative of governments" in the selection of NGOs
for involvement in Bank activities. This illustrates a desire
on the part of some governments to limit the groups that
Bank staff can contact to only those it approves, which often
may not include human rights groups.
Another notable development was the Bank's publication in
October of a short report entitled Development and Human
Rights: The World Bank's Role. It commemorates the 50th an-
niversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and it
includes a foreword by Mary Robinson, the UN High Commis-
sioner for Human Rights. What is important about the report is
not so much what it says - its aim is not surprisingly to put the
World Bank in the best possible light in relation to human
rights and therefore does not mention a whole range of human
rights problems, particularly ones related to the implementa-
tion of projects. What is important in my view is that the report
was issued at all, something that would not have happened very
long ago, and that, by this report, there is an explicit recogni-
tion by the Bank of the relevance of the Universal Declaration
to its activities. It should also be noted that the report's discus-
sion of the limits presented by its charter to the consideration of
human rights is more nuanced than in the past, something that
is especially welcome.
Other developments include the Bank's reporting and some
policy development on several rights or rights-related issues,
e.g., gender, child labor, post-conflict reconstruction, and the
creation in some cases of institutional structures and joint ef-
forts which involve external players to focus on these issues.
Recent examples of the latter include the Structural Adjust-
ment Participatory Review Initiative (SAPRI) and the External
Gender Consultative Group.
A fundamental point must also be made: leadership is im-
portant in increasing the World Bank's attention to human
rights and James Wolfensohn, since he became the Bank's pres-
11 The NGO Unit, Social Development, "The Bank's Relations with NGOs: Is-
sues and Directors, Social Developent Paper No. 28 (World Bank, August 11,
1998).
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ident in 1995, has taken a number of important, if not yet fully
realized, steps in this direction. That said, any effort to seek re-
form in the Bank cannot ignore or underestimate the size, com-
plexity, culture and tradition of this 53-year-old institution.
Having described how the World Bank views human rights,
I would now like to mention some of the types of human rights
issues that are often raised.
On a policy level, one example has already been mentioned
- the flawed draft Handbook on Good Practices for Laws Relat-
ing to NGOs. Other issues include operational policies gov-
erning indigenous peoples and involuntary resettlement, both of
which directly implicate human rights.
But it is often the case that the policy is not the problem,
but rather its implementation. Moreover, the human rights is-
sues presented by Bank-supported projects are often more di-
rectly related to the overall human rights environment that
exists in the country. While the Bank rarely is the instigator of
violations, it is not a minor player as it has great influence in
the selection and design of projects and has supervisory obliga-
tions during implementation. Some projects with human rights
problems that have received recent attention include:
1. Structural adjustment programs which reduce resources
available for social services like heath care, education, hous-
ing and the like.
2. The Yacyreta Hydroelectric Project in Argentina and Para-
guay is supported by both the World Bank and Inter-Ameri-
can Development Bank and implemented by a binational
organization. Human rights problems have included serious
health concerns related to the manner in which the dam has
been built and filled; intimidation of critics; and loss of liveli-
hood without compensation. The project was developed with-
out consultation or information to those affected by the
project.
3. The Lagos Drainage and Sanitation Project in Nigeria has
been the subject of NGO reports that the residents of 15 Lagos
slums were forcibly evicted by the government, in an opera-
tion that included the demolition of homes and other property
without compensation, resettlement or rehabilitation. Resi-
dents were also threatened and intimidated by armed secur-
ity agents.
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4. In connection with the NTPC Power Generation Project in
Singrali, India, government and/or power company authori-
ties engaged in a pattern of human rights violations against
persons displaced by the project who sought to peacefully pro-
test. Violations included arbitrary detention, degrading treat-
ment in custody, indiscrimnate use of force, as well as limits
on freedom of assembly and association.
5. A Chadian legislator who was critical on corruption grounds
of the proposed Chad-Cameroon Petroleum Development and
Pipeline Project was charged, convicted and jailed for insult-
ing and defaming the Chadian president. Two journalists
were similarly charged and have stopped reporting on the
project. Local NGO representatives at a recent meeting were
quoted as saying: "We are limited by survival concerns when
we conflict with decision-makers" and "Government repres-
sion is our reality."
When the World Bank works in places where repression is the
normal response to criticism, it must approach those projects
with extreme care.
We know about these projects because NGO efforts have
brought them wider attention. But repression of NGOs can also
make them reluctant to take up monitoring at all. In some coun-
tries, independent NGOs are so severely restricted that few if
any exist. In such situations, the Bank is left to consult with
international NGOs, who may be very good but are less desira-
ble then local groups, or it consults with GONGOs - govern-
ment-organized NGOs which cannot be described as
independent - or it doesn't consult with anyone outside gov-
ernment. None of these solutions are apt to provide the Bank
with an honest local perspective or the views it needs to do an
effective job.
I hope that two things are clear from the above. First,
there are real opportunities to increase the Bank's attention to
human rights. But second, there is little likelihood of such con-
crete or systematic attention by the Bank without the active in-
volvement of NGOs.
In addition to the new opportunities noted earlier, the Asia
crisis has meant that the Bank can no longer use economic
growth as an excuse for ignoring the behavior of repressive and
authoritarian governments. While new Bank policies provide
sometimes explicit, or at least implicit, recognition of human
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rights, it is essential that they be monitored if there is to be any
assurance of implementation. An NGO role at the World Bank
is critical for the advancement of human rights. The Bank has
not reached the point where it treats human rights law - na-
tional or international - in the same way that it looks at com-
mercial law, e.g., trade, intellectual property, and the like, even
when both have equal stature.
There are several ways which I believe will advance human
rights and the ability to undertake human rights advocacy at
the Bank. I'll mention five here:
1. Create a pre-approval project assessment process to consider:
1) the effects of proposed projects on human rights in a coun-
try and 2) the effects of human rights observance in a country
on the purpose and likely success of the proposed project, and
take this information into account during the appraisal of the
project.
2. Use Bank oversight and evaluation mechanisms, such as pub-
lic expenditure reviews, to assess the condition of economic
and social rights in a country, and make its findings public.
3. Further liberalize the Bank's information policy and increase
the translation of documents into local languages.
4. Adopt requirements for the mandatory release to and consul-
tation with non-governmental actors of the Country Assist-
ance Strategy during its preparation. The CAS is an
important document outlining the future needs and priorities
to be addressed by the Bank.
5. Strengthen the Inspection Panel, for example, to provide
those who file complaints with an opportunity to review and
react to Bank management's response; to allow the Panel
members to visit the site and interview complainants.
A final point. The World Bank is not the UN Commission
on Human Rights, but it undertakes a wide variety of activities
which directly affect human rights. Greater attention by the
Bank to human rights is not without challenges and sensitivi-
ties, but there has been movement and there are new opportu-
nities. The Bank's recent human rights report commemorates
the 50th anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, and the relevance of that event to its mandate. NGOs
must redouble efforts to see that this recognition is not simply a
public relations effort.
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Q: Would the panelists address the issue of corruption,
which has affected so many of the poor countries?
PROF. McDONNELL: Patricia, do you want to start off?
PROF. ARMSTRONG:
Corruption is, as I mentioned, getting lots of consideration
at the Bank, realizing, again, that development effectiveness is
a key. So there is a recognition that they are not getting the
bang for their buck because of corruption.
Again, it is not the same as human rights. But, as a friend
of mine says, "human rights is the caboose on the anti-corrup-
tion train." Therefore, it is a real opportunity on a whole range
of human rights issues to raise our concerns and get the Bank's
attention, because it is focusing for a variety of reasons. They
are having many P.R. problems. Particularly, Indonesia is a
good example most recently.
PROF. NAGAN:
There is no question that the whole notion of the clientless
state, which some of the early scholarship focused on and was
largely ignored, is very critical, I think, just from a state angle.
But the states are not the only players in the corruption game.
We have formal definitions of the state territory, people, things
like that. What we have not done is functionally label them -
and some of them are, obviously, thought control, drug control,
and so forth. So we tend to use the abstraction "sovereignty"
without regard for the real dynamism inside the state and how
it is actually organized.
In fact, the notion of combatting corruption may be the
most radical invention that we can bring to development and to
human rights work. The simple notion of accounting for people
who believe the state is a milk cow, or corporations that have
cozy relations with a state, or the problems basically even of
development.
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For example, in South Africa, they have had radical dispos-
session of the blacks over 300 years, and now the question is,
how do they get economic empowerment? Of course, for many
people, there is a search for shortcuts to it, and so corruption
has become virtually a kind of freedom-destroying kind of virus
on the effort to create a culture, as opposed to the apartheid
culture, of human rights and development.
So I think the corruption issue is one of the most important
issues. Simple as it may sound, the notion of accountants who
may not have their throats cut is quite a vital thing as well in
making this go.
But we also have to put this into the context of NGOs and
the many different kinds of NGOs. Alan Bussack right now is
on trial for allegedly leading the good life with Danish money in
South Africa. And so, the corruption factor is not just statal,
but it can permeate all the other institutions that otherwise
started out with good intentions.
So yes, it is a critical factor, and maybe even an under-ap-
preciated factor.
MR. DICKER:
Could I just add very quickly, in responding to your ques-
tion, that certainly we have seen such close links between cor-
ruption and human rights violations. Where corruption exists
pervasively, it is often facilitated by a government's violations
of its citizens' right to free expression or free association. And
certainly in those instances - we are seeing this in parts of
west Africa now, where corruption about the construction of an
oil pipeline from Chad to Cameroon is taking place,1 and those
who have been speaking out about the corruption have been im-
prisoned for exercising their right to free expression.
So there is a very, very close nexus in many situations, and
I think we've got some work to do to figure out, from a human
rights reporting perspective, how to do a better job of including
that into at least the context of our report.
1 See Tansamu, Chad-Cameroon: Oil Pipeline Project Brought To a Stand-
still, INTER PRESS SERVICE, Sept. 1, 1998, 1998 WL 5989059, AFRICA NEWS SER-
VICE, Aug. 4, 1998, 1998 WL 14362793.
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PROF. McDONNELL: Another question?
Q: Accountants have come out with standards for whistle
blowing as part of their job when they find a client has not re-
ported properly. I have not noticed too many attorneys, includ-
ing those involved in tobacco or working for major financial
corporations, following that same standard. In fact, although
they are listed, they are very rarely enforced. How would you
deal with that?
I have seen it in this country, for example, where corporate
officers' lawyers effectively allow human rights violations, or vi-
olations of certainly many of this country's laws. How can they
then apply that in other countries?
PROF. NAGAN:
There is one. I am involved with something now with AID. 2
Essentially, we have had to transfer vast amounts of money to
Uganda. It is always a nightmare to make sure that every cent
is accounted for and there is a paper trail that follows all of this.
What AID wants to do is to insist that it be done through the
U.S. to them. I tried to tell them, "Why don't you do it over
there?" We held the grant up because of this particular prob-
lem, because it is very difficult. I have had to make many trips
over there to do the paper trail. In fact, the vast amount of the
human rights work I have done has been basically accounting.
You get the grant and then you have to do all these fancy
things.
Even with Amnesty International, when I became Chair,
with perhaps the naivete of an outsider coming in there, but I
really wanted to ask some very naive questions that did not nec-
essarily show up on the way in which the accountants had for-
mulated things. It did help to rationalize our own way of doing
things, because we wanted to know where this went, what hap-
pened afterwards, and why are we putting more money into it if
we got nothing out of it.
Uganda again is an interesting case because there is a fe-
tish for paper now. You know, one of the reactions has been
that everything has got to be on paper with an accounting and
2 Agency For International Development.
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so on, which has actually in some ways made our task a little
easier.
But there is no question that the resource issue which I
raised is one of the problems of NGOs, but also of governments,
and the paper trail for money and the transparency is the cure
for a great deal of what actually happens. Greed and venality
and so on are not outside of the framework of human feeling
and motivation and so forth.
QUESTIONER:
I think one of the difficulties is that, although we have laws
about bribery, in joint ventures with foreign corporations those
laws are very, very hard to enforce. It is very hard to enforce
rules of corruption where the partner, the foreign corporation, is
doing the bribery.
PROF. NAGAN:
You are talking about the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 3?
QUESTIONER: Yes.
PROF. NAGAN: That makes most American businessmen
crooks.
QUESTIONER: Exactly.
PROF. McDONNELL: Richard, did you want to respond?
MR. DICKER:
Just on that aspect of it, again what we have heard from
many of our interlocutors in the corporate sector has been the
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act creates a real disadvantage for
American corporations - "Of course we support it, we honor it,
but in Germany there is no such statutory prohibition and our
German counterparts hand envelopes full of money over to cor-
porate officials, government officials, and how can we compete
with that?"
Again, I think what that does underscore is the need for
moving this debate out of just the national arena and trying to
put it on the level of international standard setting.
3 15 U.S.C. § 78 (1988).
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Q: As the ethical investment bandwagon has been picking
up a lot of steam, at least in Britain and Europe, and I imagine
in the States as well, that has had a lot of effect on corporate
practice. At the same time, consumer action in fields like carpet
manufacture - the symbol which shows that they are not made
by children - and so on. And then, we saw the instance of the
oil rig that Shell wanted to ditch in the Atlantic and consumer
action in Germany had a big effect on that.
It seems to me that the field is pretty wide open, if only we
NGOs can get together and work out a satisfactory code of con-
duct and then insist on its being followed, a frame in which,
either by consumer action or by shareholder action, penalties
will be imposed. I wonder what you think the prospects are for
NGOs getting together worldwide to work out such a code.
MR. DICKER:
Let me make two points. First, with the broad trend that
you have cited, in terms of things being pretty well wide open,
actually I really agree with that. I think back just a couple of
years ago, to 1994, when President Clinton made the decision to
de-link most-favored nation trade status for China and Chinese
human rights practices, 4 and how at least the American corpo-
rate community was on a roll - I mean, it really was a jugger-
naut the way corporate America organized itself to bring about
the end of that kind of connection between human rights and
investment policy of the United States Government.
In a sense, I think the terrain has changed a good deal
since then. I mean, that was a moment in my perception that
the corporate community was really, really flexing its muscle
extremely powerfully.
I think the kinds of developments you alluded to, in terms
of consumer actions that have occurred over the last few years
as a result of a range of NGO actors, from the National Labor
Committee, to the Interfaith Center for Corporate Responsibil-
ity - I mean, there are many, many NGO actors in this field.
And I think the terrain has changed, whereby the corporate sec-
4 Presidential Press Conference on China Most Favored Nation Status, May
26, 1994, (visited March 12, 1999) <http://www.pub.Whitehouse.gov/retrieve-
documents.html>.
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tor is more unnoticed and a bit more on the defensive. I think
that is a very positive development.
I think that we are not simply talking about the apparel
and footwear companies traditionally - Levi, Reebok, Liz Clai-
borne, those companies that have been out in front in a good
way on a voluntary basis trying to change their practices - but
we have seen it in the oil industry among a few companies. So I
think conditions, in a way, are positive.
I also think that you are absolutely right, that what this
would require is a worldwide international effort on the part of
the NGO community reflecting its disparate segments -
human rights, environmental, et cetera. I think we need to be
dreamers and visionaries. I think that is possible. I think the
conditions are there to make it happen.
PROF. NAGAN:
I think there are several levels of response, and I will try to
be brief.
One is simply whether one approaches the relationship
with corporations from an adverse point of view. I was very in-
volved in the anti-apartheid aspect of it in the university divest-
ment in the early 1970s and then later. That has certainly paid
dividends.
But basically, it is very tough to take on these major play-
ers. So there are limits, but certainly you can do that. I suspect
that most human rights NGOs tend to posture themselves in
adverse relationships.
Now, the Secretary General has taken a different view most
recently. Maybe it is the Ted Turner initiative. Not all corpora-
tions are necessarily going to be adverse. There is a difference
between Turner and Murdoch.
So his position - and I think it is a correct one in my view,
with all due respect to my colleagues - was to say, "Look, we've
got to reach out to these guys and show them that it is in their
interest that peace, that human rights, that development and
other related, coordinated strategies are on their agenda as well
and that they have some responsibility for it."
Now, that is a different strategy. That is a more coopera-
tive strategy. To some people, that is a selling-out. I under-
stand the dynamic here.
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But the problem of globalism that is positive for the vast
majority of the have-nots of the planet, if you look at - I think
somebody mentioned Africa yesterday; half the people of sub-
Saharan Africa are living on a buck a day. So there is this abso-
lute brutal, grinding, poverty dynamic here.
I think that, unfortunately, or rightly or wrongly, the ex-
isting reality is that if a Third World country does not come into
the system more or less the way it is, you do not have to do
anything to them; you can just leave them to completely wither
on the vine. So that the old socialists from South Africa have
become global capitalists, and even the residue of the Commu-
nist Party in South Africa says, "We are investing in these cor-
porations. What are we going to do with our dough? We are
going to have seven hours on Marxism."
So I think this is not simple, but I think the brute reality is
that these are major centers of global power, and I do not think
you can always confront them in this kind of adversarial mode,
and you cannot assume that they themselves are not complex
organizations, and you have to find out the extent to which you
can shift them into a different paradigm and redefine their own
self-interest.
QUESTIONER:
I do agree with that, particularly now that NGOs them-
selves are having to have very often sponsorship of some of
these countries.
PROF. NAGAN: I am afraid Amnesty ran with Reebok.
Q: I have a question following up on what you just said.
We have done this with tobacco and with other financial institu-
tions. Corporations have seen that it is in their interest and to
their bottom line in many different ways and will be more coop-
erative to make changes. That is one thing.
The other is there are corporations that are doing this.
Why not get those corporations together and see what they have
done and see how then they can influence other corporations to
also become good partners and good players for working in this
field? Let's work with them and take what is good and then see
where we can grow and develop from there.
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MR. DICKER:
I think that is very important, and I think - Trish, maybe
you know more about this than I do - but I think the apparel
industry partnership effort, which - I cannot recall - six or
seven of the most human rights-conscious footwear and apparel
companies are exactly trying to do that, reach out to other com-
panies in that sector and bring them into the kind of agreement
that they have made as part of the AIP. 5 I think that is very
important.
We have talked to certain oil companies about playing that
same kind of role. The world oil industry sector is not uniform.
You can see more advanced companies, and exactly the question
is: what can they do to turn their competitors and bring them
along? That is at an early stage.
I think, to be frank about it, their response is a kind of a
polite, but very cynical, reaction, "The guys down the block at
Exxon are not going to pay any attention to this whatsoever." I
do not think we should just accept that. I think we've got to be
tenacious on that, but I think that is a very important strategy.
Lastly, as an overarching thing, I certainly do not mean to
suggest that it is a question simply of confrontation. I think it
is a question of working with the best. I think we have to be
clear ourselves. We have different objectives, different inter-
ests. We have to try to be able, between the best elements in
the corporate community and the NGO community, to identify
where our interests overlap and how we can work together, and
be honest and candid with one another that we will not always
agree and that is just the nature of the world.
PROF. McDONNELL: Patricia, did you want to respond?
MS. ARMSTRONG: No.
PROF. McDONNELL: Other questions?
Q: I just have a comment to make. I was talking to some-
one who mentioned an exciting development in terms of the
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. In December 1997, the OECD 6
5 Apparel Industry Partnership Effort.
6 Organisation For Economic Cooperation and Development.
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completed a treaty, a Bribery Convention, 7 which does require
OECD nations to adopt and enforce it. It not only requires
OECD nations to make bribery an offense within their jurisdic-
tions, which they probably already had, but it also requires
them to make bribery overseas anywhere by their nationals an
offense, which could be a precursor to these international stan-
dards that we have been talking about. It is in, I think, a very
controversial area, to make a judgment about bribery overseas.
I think just seeing how that works will be very interesting.
Q: Just a brief comment. I think that the argument put
forward by some corporations, the argument based on if they do
not do it others will, is a very insensitive, immoral, and many
think it is an unlawful argument that should not be given any
weight at all and we should waste no time refuting this argu-
ment. This is one comment.
My other point is that it is very hard for some NGOs to be
objective and to stay with a humanitarian, even-handed ap-
proach to problems. I had a discussion yesterday with an Am-
nesty International activist who was asking me about the
Lebanese detainees in south Lebanon in the so-called Israeli se-
curity zone, without showing any interest at all in the condi-
tions and plight of thousands of Lebanese detainees in Syria.
MS. ARMSTRONG:
Could I just make one point? There is a similarity here to
your first point, about when the corporation says "if we do not
do it, someone else will." The World Bank says something quite
similar: "Our involvement means our higher standards will be
applied, and therefore it is better for us to be involved. You do
not want us to leave. You should not press us to leave this
otherwise-questionable project because of that reason."
PROF. McDONNELL:
Thank you, and I would like to thank the panelists for their
discussion.
7 United Nations Declaration Against Corruption and Bribery in Interna-
tional Commercial Transactions, G.A. Res. 191, U.N. GAOR, 51st Sess., U.N. Doc.
A/601 (1997).
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An aging pot of flowers adorned with a cross hangs from the
picket fence where gay University of Wyoming student Mat-
thew Shepard was tied, beaten, and left just outside of Laramie.
Shepard was beaten October 6, 1998 and moved to a Fort Col-
lins hospital after he was found with severe head injuries.
Shepard died on October 12, 1998.
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